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Abstract                 
                              
The preoccupations about conceiving and promoting efficient anti-corruption strategies exist in 
most states, especially in the developing countries.  
 
The opportunity of such strategies derives from the direct link, demonstrated theoretically and 
empirically, between the effects of the anti-corruption strategies and government performance, 
translated both in the economic and social results and living standard, welfare etc. 
 
In the last decades, the transnational actors – UN, World Bank, OECD, EU etc. -  have affirmed as 
promoters of own anti-corruption strategies,  directing the states’ efforts, conferring adequate levels 
of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability. 
 
The South-Eastern European states incorporate own anti-corruption strategies in the framework of 
general strategies, aiming the government reform in the context of the European integration process.  
 
Strengthening the public integrity, reducing corruption, developing a genuine climate of economic 
freedom become important objectives concerning the impact on government performance. 
 
The paper incorporates briefly the main characteristics of anti-corruption strategies, developed by 
transnational actors and it aims to shape theoretical and empirical frameworks for the impact of 
anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The focus on some South-Eastern European states has a demonstrative character, as the presented 
analyses may be extended to various geo-political areas. 
 
 
Key words: anti-corruption strategies, assessment, impact, government performance. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption, through extended and diversified forms of expression has become an object of study 
and analysis, both for experts, analysts and public authorities and institutions. The latter, concerned 
by the effects of corruption on the social and economic development have aimed and achieved a 
series of anti-corruption strategies, focused on combating and eliminating the causes of corruption, 
thus also their consequences. For the public organizations, found frequently in public 
administrations and generally in the public sector, theories have been formulated aimed at 
minimization of the corruption phenomena.  
 
The governance processes and corruption phenomena are in a direct connection and benefit of 
profound analyses. Dealing corruption from the economic, cultural or political perspective, Rose-
Ackerman (2005, 4-5) reveals four dimensions:  
 The first one is carried out on the background of public organisations, state and society, 
where corruption could create inefficiency and inequity. The purpose of reforms is not to 
eliminate corruption but to improve state efficiency, fairness and legitimacy. In this context, 
it is worth to mention a fundamental idea for the anti- corruption strategies: “the total 
elimination of corruption will never be worthwhile, but steps can be taken to limit its reach 
and reduce the harms it causes”  
 Corruption has different meanings in different societies. It is difficult to establish a clear 
border between legal and illegal, between merit and bribe.  
 How the basic structures of the public and private sector can produce or repress corruption. 
The prospect of a reform will change both the constitutional structures and the fundamental 
relation between market and state.  
 The difficulty of reform for public or governmental organisations and the role of the 
international community in reform. The internal reform policy is essential, and between 
various organisations valuable lessons can be transferred even if the conditions are not 
always similar.  
 
Although the author asserts: “this book does not present a blueprint for reform”, she suggests “a 
range of alternatives that reforms must tailor to the conditions in individual countries”. However 
“reform should not be limited to the creation of integrity systems” and “the primary goal should 
be to reduce the underlying incentives to pay and receive bribes, not to tighten systems of ex 
post control”.  
Previously to Rose-Ackerman’s assertions, Banfield (1975, 593) analyses the key features that a 
public organization should meet in order to minimize corruption. Briefly, they are:  
 the executive agents are selected on the basis of probity and institutional loyalty;  
 there is a complete set of positive motivations for the loyal public service (including a 
high salary);  
 there is a complete set of negative motivations, applied compulsory when corrupt acts 
were already identified;  
 the goals and missions for a job are formulated clearly and univoque by director;  
 the agents hold the necessary discretion for executing the job tasks;  
 no ambiguities in rules;  
 the director monitors the agent’s performance;  
 if there is the smallest doubt about the agent’s probity, he/she is dismissed.  
 the director, on his/her turn is also monitored.  
 
The preoccupations of international organisations may be added to the above contributions, 
substantiating anti-corruption strategies at the level of government or sectoral public organisations. In 
this respect, the World Bank has asserted as an important and competent actor in the analysis concerning 
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the causes and consequences of corruption. The control of corruption has become a core indicator of 
governance and the strategies grounded on this indicator represent pillars for national authorities.  
The World Bank promotes good governance and anti-corruption actions as important pillars for 
reducing the poverty. The World Bank sustains the national or regional efforts for public integrity, 
minimization of corruption, as well as awarding assistance to countries in view of governance 
improvement and control of corruption, by means of the World Bank Institute (WBI).  
The preoccupations about designing and promoting anti-corruption policies as well as evaluating the 
causes/consequences of the corruption phenomenon are also present in the European Union, OECD or 
other transnational bodies such as International Monetary Fund, USAID, Transparency International, 
Heritage Foundation etc.  
 
I. Anti-corruption strategies of the transnational actors – guiding framework for the national anti-
corruption strategies 
 
I.1. World Bank: Designing Effective Anticorruption Strategies 
 
The strategies (World Bank, 2000, 58-78) are based on the studies and field analyses carried out even by 
the World Bank or prestigious authors for the topic on combating corruption. The actual strategy offers 
“a framework for self-assessment of corruption within each country rather than a device for providing a 
fixed reform blueprint for each country in the region”. At the same time, “a key argument embedded in 
the typology is that an anti-corruption strategy should be designed not only in response to the level of 
either state capture or administrative corruption alone in a given country, but to the interaction of these 
forms of corruption as well” (World Bank, 2000, 59). 
 
The relation between “state capture” and “administrative corruption”, in better words, its intensity, 
represents the basis of the conception for many anti-corruption strategies.  
Defined by Hellman and Kaufmann (2001), with reverberations especially in transition economies, state 
capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to 
influence making of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as 
a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.  
Types of institutions subject to capture:  
 the legislature,  
 the executive,  
 the judiciary, or  
 regulatory agencies.  
 
Types of actors engaged in capturing:  
 private firms,  
 political leaders, or  
 narrow interest groups.  
 
Yet all forms of state capture are directed toward extracting rents from the state for a narrow range of 
individuals, firms, or sectors through distorting the basic legal and regulatory framework with 
potentially enormous losses for the society at large. They thrive where economic power is highly 
concentrated, countervailing social interests are weak, and the formal channels of political influence 
and interest intermediation are underdeveloped. 
On the other hand, administrative corruption refers to the intentional imposition of distortions in the 
prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide advantages to either 
state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gains to 
public officials. Examples of administrative corruption: bribes to a seemingly endless stream of 
official inspectors to overlook minor (or possibly major) offences of existing regulations; “grease 
payments” as bribes to gain licenses, to smooth customs procedures, to win public procurement 
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contracts, or to be given priority in the provision of a variety of other government services; state 
officials can simply misdirect public funds under their control for their own or their family’s direct 
financial benefit. At the root of this form of corruption is discretion on the part of public officials to 
grant selective exemptions, to prioritize the delivery of public services, or to discriminate in the 
application of rules and regulations. (Figure 1.1) 
 
Figure 1.1 Multi -pronged Strategy: Addressing State Capture and Administrative  
                 Corruption (Source: World Bank, 2000, 39) 
 
 
 
 
To be effective, a multi-pronged approach requires some guidelines for the selection and 
sequencing of reform priorities tailored to the particular contours of the corruption problem in each 
country.  
The typology can be divided into four spheres determined by the relative levels of state capture and 
administrative corruption: 
 Countries within the medium-medium category have been able to contain both types of 
corruption to more manageable levels, though serious challenges remain. 
 In the medium-high category are countries where the problem of administrative corruption 
remains the central problem, while the state has been less subject to capture by the private 
sector than other transition countries. 
 The high-medium category includes countries that have been able to contain the level of 
administrative corruption relative to other transition countries, but nevertheless have done 
so in a context of high state capture. 
 In the high-high category, a serious problem of administrative corruption—and hence, weak 
state capacity—is nested in a state highly subject to capture. 
 
In the context of the above documentary sources, Table 1.1. presents a synthesis of the key focus, 
challenges and priorities for each typology of the relation state capture-administrative corruption.  
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I.2 On fighting corruption in the European Union  
 
As a safeguard instrument for ensuring a common area of freedom, security and justice, 
fighting corruption was seen among the priorities of the European Union, as early as the 
Treaty on European Union:  
“[…] the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of 
freedom, security and justice by […] preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and 
illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud, through:  
- closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in 
the Member States, both directly and through the European Police Office (Europol), in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 30 and 32;  
- closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States 
including cooperation through the European Judicial Cooperation Unit ("Eurojust"), in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32;  
- approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e)” (EC, 2002, OJ, C325).  
 
Since, the European institutions regularly underlined the necessity for developing and 
enhancing prevention measures against corruption phenomenon. The Action plan to combat 
organized crime (EC, 1997, OJ, C251)
 
offers in this regard an overall picture of the European 
Union’s concrete plans and measures for fighting corruption. According to it for instance, the 
Member States, the Council and the Commission, should develop:  
 
“[…]a comprehensive policy to tackle corruption, including appropriate and efficient sanctions, 
but also tackling all aspects linked with the proper functioning of the internal market and other 
internal policies, as well as external assistance and cooperation (political guideline 13). […]This 
policy should primarily focus on elements of prevention, addressing such issues as the impact of 
defective legislation, public-private relationships, transparency of financial management, rules on 
participation in public procurement, and criteria for appointments to positions of public 
responsibility, etc. It should also cover the area of sanctions, be they of a penal, administrative or 
civil character, as well as the impact of the Union's policy on relations with third States.”  
 
In 2000 in fact, “The prevention and control of organized crime: A European Union Strategy 
for the beginning of the new millennium” (EC, 2000, OJ, C124) became a reality. It was there 
that the European Communities reiterated the need for instruments aimed at the 
approximation of national legislation and developing a more general (multi-disciplinary) EU 
policy towards corruption, taking into account as appropriate work being carried out in 
international organizations. Furthermore, the same document urged those Member States, 
which had not yet ratified the relevant EU and Council of Europe anti-corruption legal 
instruments to ensure speedy ratification within a clear timeframe.  
Finally, in 2003, the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU policy against 
corruption (COM 2003, 317 final) reaffirmed that tackling corruption and fraud within the 
EU institutions and bodies had became an absolute priority for the EU in the last years. In 
addition, it stated that:  
 
“The crisis triggered by the Commission’s resignation in March 1999 revealed the necessity to set 
up more effective measures for the protection of the integrity of the European Public 
Administration. In order to improve the legal framework in that field, the Commission had defined 
various initiatives in its overall strategy for the protection of the Community financial interests of 
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2000, its action plan 2001-2003, and more recently, its evaluation report on the OLAF activities” 
(chapter 5, p.13).  
 
Among the actions to develop in order to better fight against corruption, the above 
Communication enumerated, inter alia: raising integrity in the public and private sectors, 
amending national legislation in order to exclude any tax deductibility of bribes, ensuring 
transparency and non-discriminatory access to procurement opportunities, organizing bodies 
of special nature in-between the public and the private sector for fighting corruption, 
encouraging anti-corruption policies in the acceding, candidate and other third countries on 
the basis of ten general principles.  
 
1.To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from leaders and decision-
makers. Bearing in mind that no universally applicable recipes exist, national anti-corruption 
strategies or programmes, covering both preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn up 
and implemented. These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels.  
2.Current and future EU Members shall fully align with the EU acquis and ratify and implement 
all main international anti-corruption instruments they are party to (UN, Council of Europe and 
OECD Conventions). Third countries should sign and ratify as well as implement relevant 
international anti-corruption instruments.  
3. Anti-corruption laws are important, but more important is their implementation by competent 
and visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. well trained and specialised services such as anti-corruption 
prosecutors). Targeted investigative techniques, statistics and indicators should be developed. The 
role of law enforcement bodies should be strengthened concerning not only corruption but also 
fraud, tax offences and money laundering.  
4. Access to public office must be open to every citizen. Recruitment and promotion should be 
regulated by objective and merit-based criteria. Salaries and social rights must be adequate. Civil 
servants should be required to disclose their assets. Sensitive posts should be subject to rotation.  
5. Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary, police, customs, 
tax administration, health sector, public procurement) should be raised through employing quality 
management tools and auditing and monitoring standards, such as the Common Assessment 
Framework of EU Heads of Public Administrations and the Strasbourg Resolution. Increased 
transparency is important in view of developing confidence between the citizens and public 
administration.  
6. Codes of conduct in the public sector should be established and monitored.  
7. Clear rules should be established in both the public and private sector on whistle blowing (given 
that corruption is an offence without direct victims who could witness and report it) and reporting.  
8. Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness-raising campaigns in 
the media and training. The central message must be that corruption is not a tolerable 
phenomenon, but a criminal offence. Civil society has an important role to play in preventing and 
fighting the problem.  
9. Clear and transparent rules on party financing, and external financial control of political parties, 
should be introduced to avoid covert links between politicians and (illicit) business interests. 
Political parties evidently have strong influence on decision-makers, but are often immune to anti-
bribery laws.  
10. Incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain from corrupt practices such as 
codes of conduct or “white lists” for integer companies.  
 
I.3. OECD - Policy Paper and Principles on Anticorruption  
 
In 2007, continuing and enhancing its efforts in the fight against corruption, OECD designed 
and formulated a “programme of collective action”, comprising the directions and principles 
in the fight against corruption (OECD, 2007).  
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This publication, which is based on proposals and broad guiding principles approved by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), comprises a DAC Policy Paper on Anti-
Corruption: “Setting an Agenda for Collective Action“ and the DAC Principles for Donor 
Action in Anti-Corruption. It argues that political leadership and enhanced accountability can 
accelerate collective efforts in fighting corruption through better governance. It highlights a 
number of frontiers for collective action where coordinated political leadership is needed if 
the multiple risks associated with corruption are to be successfully managed.  
 
I.3.1 Actions proposed by the DAC (OECD, 2007, 12-15) 
 
To promote a concerted approach to anti-corruption work at country level …  
• Facilitate joint assessments of corruption and the wider governance context in high-risk 
countries in close cooperation with other organisations, beginning with pilot exercises in 
selected countries which build on any existing work.  
• Signal its support for anti-corruption benchmarks and targets that can be agreed jointly by 
donors and partners at country level and used to monitor progress.  
• Endorse as good practice the close coordination of donor governance and anti-corruption 
work at country level.  
• Develop a set of good-practice principles (a “voluntary code of conduct’’), to be endorsed 
by ministers and rolled out at country level, on coordinated donor responses to deteriorating 
corruption contexts.  
 
To tackle the global incentive environment for corruption …  
• Encourage its members to advocate more concerted and systematic action within their own 
governments to implement and enforce international conventions to tackle the supply side of 
corruption (e.g. the offering of bribes by the private sector).  
• Support UN-led processes and efforts to encourage members to ratify and implement 
UNCAC while also encouraging DAC members to combine and integrate their joint anti-
corruption initiatives with other ongoing efforts to implement and monitor UNCAC on the 
ground. 
• Emphasise the interest to the donor community of proposals at the UNCAC Conference of 
the States Parties in December 2006 for information-gathering with respect to compliance 
and related needs for technical assistance.  
• Support international initiatives such as the proposed Global Integrity Alliance as a positive 
way forward in transforming the international incentive environment for integrity and good 
governance.  
 
I.3.2 The Principles for Donor Actions in Anti-corruption (OECD, 2007, 41-47) 
 
The Principles reflected best practice and that their widespread application would enhance 
donor effectiveness in combating corruption. The Principles were given final endorsement by 
the DAC at their 22 September 2006 meeting.  
The Principles embrace the key areas and activities where donors should work together on 
anti-corruption. They emphasize the need to support and strengthen the capacity of civil 
society, and underline the need for OECD donors to undertake work in their own countries on 
areas such as repatriation of assets, money laundering, and the ratification and 
implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003).  
 
 
 11 
The Principles are:  
 
1. Collectively foster, follow and fit into the local vision  
At the country level, donors should:  
Collectively:  
• Promote with government the development of a shared government-donor vision/strategy 
and collaborative mechanism(s) for anti-corruption dialogue and action, ideally based on 
government commitment to implement the UNCAC (or other relevant instrument).  
• Share diagnostics, knowledge and analysis through such mechanism(s), identifying gaps 
and reviewing progress.  
• Engage with other key actors through such mechanism(s) (e.g. civil society, media and the 
private sector).  
• Support and strengthen the capacity of civil society for strengthening the demand for 
reform, and promoting and monitoring transparency and accountability in the fight against 
corruption.  
• Work, where government commitment is weak, with local and international civil society 
and private sector actors as the primary alternative, but recognizing that strengthening 
government commitment is the essential objective in the long term.  
• Take time to understand local political, economic, social and historical contexts and 
challenges, and develop responses that are appropriate to them.  
• Favour long-term responses over short-term, reaction-driven inputs, but without losing the 
capacity for responding quickly to support new initiatives and emerging reformers where 
these opportunities arise.  
As individual donors:  
Agree to present anti-corruption assistance explicitly as being contributions to the shared 
vision/strategy and the collective donor approach. 
 
2. Acknowledge and respond to the supply side of corruption  
Development agencies should:  
• Foster stronger action by relevant domestic departments in their own countries against the 
supply-side of corruption in areas such as bribery by donor country companies, money 
laundering, repatriation of assets or the ratification and implementation of major international 
conventions such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  
• Inform counterparts in other development agencies of this engagement.  
• Engage proactively with the private sector in partner countries.  
• Ensure that accountability and transparency measures are included in all areas of donor 
assistance.  
• Contribute to strengthening inter-country cooperation (mutual legal assistance, mechanisms 
for asset recovery) both by strengthening capacity in developing countries for making 
requests for international legal cooperation and by collaborating with domestic departments 
where appropriate.  
 
3. Marshal knowledge and lessons systematically and measure progress  
At country level, donors should:  
• Collectively foster knowledge gathering to inform policy and operational action, drawing, 
wherever possible, on local capacity.  
• Encourage government to develop systems that better connect evidence with policy 
development.  
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• Foster the systemization and publication by government of the measurement and the 
reporting of progress on anti-corruption efforts.  
At the global level, donors should:  
• Develop a systematic approach to dividing up efforts for undertaking strategic 
research/knowledge gathering and synthesis and in sharing results. 
 
I.4 Other important actors for the anti-corruption activities 
 
I.4.1. USAID Anti-corruption Strategy 
 
USAID is one of the leaders in the fight against corruption.  
The agency’s activity lowers the opportunities and incentives for corruption, supports the 
efforts for a more powerful and independent justice, promotes independence of media, 
civil society etc. 
USAID directions of the strategy for anti-corruption efforts are focused on the following 
issues: 
 confront the dual challenges of grand and administrative corruption; 
 deploy Agency resources strategically to fight corruption; 
 incorporate anti-corruption goals and activities across Agency work; 
 build USAID’s anti-corruption knowledge. 
 
I.4.2. UNDP – Domestic Reform Strategies 
 
UNDP (1997, 51-89) approaches distinctly the issue in the fight against corruption. The 
analysis uses both the conclusions and best practices from UNDP activity as well as 
relevant contributions of other authors or actors. 
Within the general framework where the corruption acts are taking place, the incentives 
mentioned by UNDP (1997, 51) for corruption in a country are stated as follows: 
 
 the level of benefits and costs under the control of officials; 
 the formal law defining corruption, bribery and conflicts of interests and 
controlling campaign finance spending; 
 the credibility of law enforcement in acting against both those who pay and those 
who accept bribes; 
 the conditions of civil service employment; 
 incentive systems in the civil service; 
 the extent of auditing and monitoring within government; 
 the ability of citizens to learn about government activities and file complaints; 
 the level of press freedom and the freedom of individuals to form non-
governmental organizations; 
 the level of active political opposition. 
 
UNDP strategy approaches the issue of reducing the discretionary power and monopoly 
of the power by the governmental officials, improvement of law enforcement, civil 
service reform, increase of transparency and improvement of citizen participation. One 
group of proposals refers to the reform of bureaucracy. A genuine reform of bureaucracy 
reduces the incentives and opportunities of corruption. 
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“Corruption is often embedded in the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy. Low-level 
officials collect bribes and pass a share on to higher-level officials,  perhaps in the form 
of an up-front payment for the job itself”. Conversely higher ups may organise and 
rationalise the corrupt system to avoid wasteful competition between low-level officials. 
The top officials may then share the gains of their organisational ability with 
subordinates, perhaps using them to run errands, transfer funds and do other risky jobs 
that expose them to arrest. Breaking such patterns may require a fundamental 
reorganisation” (UNDP, 1997, 57-58). 
 
I.5. Basic approaches to anti-corruption 
 
McCusker (2006) achieves a review of anti-corruption strategies. 
Structured in several chapters, the most important ones for our study are as follows: 
assessment and design, implementation and impact assessment, specific methods and 
measures etc. 
The above author draws attention to the fact that in designing an anti-corruption strategy, 
it is imperative to be aware of the fundamental characteristics and nature of corruption 
itself. 
Three key schools of thought on corruption reduction and prevention are emphasised 
(McCusker, 2006, 8-9): 
 
 interventionism, in which the relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to 
occur and then intervene to capture and punish the offender. This school 
stimulates retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence but there remain a number of 
obstructive variables including:  
- the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone; 
- the majority of crimes remain unreported; 
- the demand on finite resources will inevitably be infinite given the degree 
of supervision necessary to ensure that the deterrence effect operates. 
 
 managerialism, in which those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in 
corrupt behaviour can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing 
appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. In essence, managerialism 
advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities such that those who 
generally benefit from them cease to be able to do so. There are limitations with 
this school of thought also, key amongst which are the fact that individuals do not 
necessarily operate according to the predetermined principles of managerialism. 
Organisations contain three broad categories of people who will react differently 
to corrupt influences: 
- category I: people who want to do the right thing and require guidance on 
how to achieve this;  
- category II: people who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside 
set rules;  
- category III: people who are corrupt and will operate outside of the rules 
entirely. 
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 organisational integrity which involves the integration of an organisation’s 
operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a 
norm of ethical behaviour is created. This school of thought presupposes that 
deviance stems from the organisation rather than the individuals of which it is 
comprised, as if the breach of ethics involved in corrupt practices occurs almost 
by osmosis from the malfeasant organisation to the innocent individual within it. 
Arguably, targeting individuals in anti-corruption efforts is likely to be less 
successful than targeting the organisational context in which individuals operate.  
 
The same author highlights other two aspects that may substantiate the national anti-
corruption strategies 
- corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles (Figure 1.2); 
- causes of public corruption and fraud have different importance related to 
the level of income in every country (Table 1.2). 
 
 
                     Figure 1.2: Corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cobb & Gonzalez 2005:6 
Undertaken after McCusker, 2006, 9  
 
B:  More payments to 
political parties by 
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                        Table 1.2: Importance of causes of public corruption and fraud 
 
                                                                                                                                  Important cause 
                                                                                                           Higher income                    
                                                                                                                  country 
Lower income      
       country 
Factors          % rank            % rank 
Norms and values of politicians and public servants 88.4  1 98.4  1 
Lack of control, supervision, auditing 87.2  2 93.3  2 
Interrelationships – business, politics, state 86.6  3 92.9  3 
Values and norms concerning government/state 84.6  4 79.7 11 
Public sector culture (values/norms) 83.3  5 76.8 12 
Lack of commitment of leadership 82.2  6 90.2  5 
Misorganisation and mismanagement 80.7  7 91.9  4 
Increasing strength of organised crime 79.3  8 90.0  7 
Norms and values [in] private and public [life] 78.0  9 73.7 14 
Increasing significance of lobbying 76.5 10 72.9 15 
Interrelationships – politics and administration 67.0 11 86.4  9 
Social inequality 66.7 12 90.2  6 
Low salaries in the public sector 56.9 16 87.1  8 
Economic problems (inflation/recession) 62.2 14 85.2 10 
(n)     (190)          (67)  
 
Source: Huberts, 1998:7 
Undertaken after McCusker, 2006, 9 
 
 
Karklins (2005) proposes an own scenario for the game theory in view to substantiate the 
anti-corruption strategies. 
Karklins’s chart (2005, 150) assumes:  
 a structure based on three pillars - corrupter, corruptee, third actor – placed in 
different hypostases of winner or loser; 
 understanding the interactions between each actor within a succession of 
scenarios that will form the anti-corruption strategy.  
 
 
                                   Table 1.3: Corruption winners and losers 
 
 Corrupter (A) Corruptee (B)  Third Actor (C) 
1 Win Win Win 
2 Win Win Lose 
3 Win Lose Win 
4 Win Lose Lose 
5 Lose Win Win (anti-corruption goal) 
6 Lose Lose Win (anti-corruption goal) 
7 Lose Win Lose 
8 Lose Lose Lose 
 
            Source: Karklins, 2005: 150   
            Undertaken after McCusker, 2006, 16. 
 
 
In Table 1.3., A and B can be either a citizen or an official. C can be another citizen, 
competitor, supervisor or the public at large. 
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II. Assessment frameworks of anti-corruption strategies 
 
II.1 Documentary fundamental issues  
 
Several papers approached the application of the mechanisms, especially the economic ones 
in evaluating the costs and benefits of corruption and combating corruption; even if they did 
not refer explicitly to the cost-benefit analysis, they revealed how fundamental notions and 
concepts could adapt to this topic. Thus, we mention Arrow (1963), Savedoff (2004), Getzen 
(1997), Mueller (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Huther and 
Shah (2000), Steves and Rousso (2003) etc.  
 
Fundamental notions and concepts concerning the uncertainty of decisions, informational 
asymmetry, moral hazard or public choice gain in the above papers the appropriate 
significance in evaluating the measures and anti-corruption strategies. If we add “agent 
principal” theory or “state capture”, we shape a fully framework for analysing the anti-
corruption strategies. Rose-Ackerman (2005) concludes: “the empirical research in various 
states confirms the negative influence of corruption on the economic growth and 
productivity, but is not helpful in shaping the anti-corruption strategies. She states that 
corruption is harmful but she does not identify the mechanisms for influencing the economic 
performance (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, 3). The World Bank (2008) also identifies the main 
costs of corruption, namely poverty and inequality with consequences on fiscal stability, 
economic growth, investment growth, development assistance or environment. The direct 
effects consist in “administrative corruption” and the indirect effects on “state capture”. In 
fact, Rose-Ackerman (2005), in the introductory part, approaches the costs of corruption and 
in Chapter 2, she isolates the most important situations where widespread corruption can 
determine who obtains the benefits and bears the costs of government action.  
 The government may be charged with allocating scarce benefit to individuals and 
firms using legal criteria other than willingness to pay. Bribes clear the market.  
 Officials in the public sector may have little incentive to do their jobs well, given 
official pay scales and the level of internal monitoring. They may impose delays 
and other roadblocks. Bribes act as incentive bonuses.  
 Those engaged in legal pursuits seek to reduce the costs imposed on them by 
government in the form of taxes, customs duties, regulations. Bribes lower costs.  
 Illegal businesses frequently purchase corrupt benefits from the state. In extreme 
cases illegal businesses and organized crime bosses dominate the police and other 
parts of the state through corruption and intimidation. Bribes permit criminal 
activity.  
 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. A bribe that acts as an incentive payment, for 
example, might also allocate a scarce benefit or provide a tax exemption. Nevertheless, each 
raises enough distinctive issues so that it is worth considering each one separately (Rose-
Ackerman, 2005, 9-10). 
 
Schacter and Shah (2000) highlight three broad categories of corruption consistent with the 
definition provided by the World Bank: 
 Bureaucratic or "petty" corruption -  a great number of public officials are abusing 
      public office in view to obtain small bribes or favours;  
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 Grand corruption – including abuse of high amount of public funds by a relatively 
small number of public officials; 
 "State capture" or "regulatory capture" – which means collusion among public 
and private agents for private benefit (Huther and Shah, 2000, 1). 
 
Concerning the impact of the anti-corruption strategies, the opinions of specialists, 
theoreticians and practitioners are divided. Tay and Seda (2003) speak about three types 
of attitudes, namely: 
 many governments do not recognise corruption as a serious problem and therefore 
award  small places on the national agenda; 
 many times the anti-corruption strategies gain aspects of mono-therapy; 
 many reforms that succeeded to be adopted have faced obstacles in 
implementation. 
 
However,  the range of potential actions in view of corruption reduction is very broad, so 
that it is necessary a framework in order to provide a guideline on “ordering potential 
actions”.  
 
The privatization of various actions depends both on the conceptual and empirical visions 
on what is functioning and what is not functioning in the special context of a country. 
Such a framework is imperative both for assessment on behalf of national authorities and 
transnational actors (Huther and Shah, 2000, 2). 
 
II.2 Models of the assessment frameworks for the anti-corruption strategies 
 
The models presented below aim the most relevant examples of assessment of the anti-
corruption strategies, usually designed and promoted at the initiative of transnational actors 
such as World Bank or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Of course the 
models presented, belong to authors recognised for their contributions and expertise in the 
study on corruption and anti-corruption. McCusker (2006, 36-76) presents a comprehensive 
list of the most recognised contributions in the mentioned fields. For the needs of our study, 
we shall approach Huther and Shah (2000), Steves and Rousso (2003), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), Gamboa-Cavazos et al. (2006) as well as Matei (2006), Andrei, Matei and Rosca 
(2009, Ch. 6, 143-161) or Matei and Matei (2009). 
 
II.2.1 Corruption market as support of the models for assessing the anti-corruption strategies 
The “corruption market” is up to present an abstract model, difficult for 
operationalisation in empirical studies. However, it draws attention to the need to 
emphasise the possible actors and scenarios of corruption in view to be able to 
substantiate models of assessment of the anti-corruption strategies. 
Regarding the relation between government performance and corruption, other papers 
also confirm the non-linear character of this relation and the fact that “at low or high 
levels of performance of a ruling party or politician, the corruption is more intense, while 
at intermediate levels, is weaker” (Gamboa-Cavazos et al., 2006). 
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Moreover, the study already mentioned discovers that the firms that accumulate more 
incomes from their industries are those willing to offer more bribery, fact also directly 
related to the political stability. The relation between the corrupt and the corruptor is 
bivalent in the sense that each of the two actors may be an active actor. As such, the 
reality confirms that for instance, in the case of the firms in economic decline, the public 
persons pretend higher payments for corruption. In a mutual way, the entrepreneurs have 
the impulse to bribe the officials with stable and long term political horizons. For those, 
the supply for corruption is increasing both in number and effective value.  
Most of the times, in the relation established between the corrupt and the corruptor, 
negotiation and intermediation usually occur under the form of traffic of influence where 
public or private persons are involved.  
As such, we can talk of a corruption market which may appear at the interface between 
the public and private. The dimensions of this market differ from one country to another 
and depend on different factors, amongst which we found the ones described in the 
previous sections.  
The corruption market is based itself on several principles to which one can add or 
further detail (Matei, 2006, 8-9; Andrei, Matei and Rosca, 2009, 153-158): 
• The existence of a demand and supply of corruption. Usually, goods that are 
offered or requested are public goods, public services, or different forms for 
facilitating access to the ownership of public goods or services (usually described 
by obtaining licenses, approvals, etc.). Even though they do not explicitly imply 
the existence of a market for corruption, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) analyze 
corruption in the context offered by the demand and supply of public goods. They 
suggest that there is a competition between a seller and a buyer which enables the 
extension of corruption.  
• The mechanisms that regulate the functioning of the corruption market  are not 
legal or visible and generally, refer to law imperfections, lack of control from 
legal instances and of course, favourable attitude to corrupt or being corrupted, 
adopted by public or private persons; 
• In relation to the intensity of the ratio between the demand and supply of 
corruption, there is a price of corruption expressed, usually, by bribery. The 
appearance of such a price differs from the one to be found in economic theory 
and basis itself upon factors related to economic circumstances, opportunity of 
public interventions, etc., as well as power and political and administrative 
position of the one corrupted.  
The above principles have been taken into account, even though, not explicitly, by other 
authors, as well. We refer here to Campante (2005) or Gamboa – Cavazos (2006). 
As in any other market, the actors try to maximize their profits. As such, for the offer of 
corruption where the actor is a public person, politician, governmental official, etc., the 
evaluation tendency will increase, while for the demand, having as an actor a private 
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person, an entrepreneur, owner of private employee, the evaluation tendency of the 
opportunity of corruption will decrease.  
Starting from a simple analysis of the demand and supply on the corruption market, 
Gamboa – Cavazos (2006, 9) assume linear relations between the two, using the price c. 
So, the mentioned authors consider: 
 For the supply: 
 
( ) ccS δγ +=          (1) 
 For the demand: 
 
( ) ccD βα −=          (2) 
where c is the price of corruption and 0,, 〉βαδγ  are parameters.  
The interaction between the demand and supply determines the level of balance of 
corruption and their price (c*), that is: 
δβ
γα
+
−
=
*c          (3) 
and ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δβγαδγ +−+= /*cS        (4) 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δβγαβα +−−= /*cD       (5) 
Of course, the model formulated by Gamboa – Cavazos is simple. However, it allows a 
certain connection with the political stability or permanence. Firstly, an observation 
should be made: from (4) and (5), parameters  and γ  intervene and are connected to the 
structure of the market where the governmental agencies (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Campante, 2005), while the second set,  and  is 
connected just to the structure of the market where the firms operate (Ades and Di Tella, 
1999; Laffont and N’Guessan, 1999). With these definitions in mind, we continue with an 
extension of the model of corruption market and determination of more complex balance 
conditions. 
First, we suggest accepting the idea according to which the corruption market behaves as 
a system with self-regulation. The analyses made in the previous sections claim this very 
thing. In the same time, the same system represented by the corruption market or, better 
said, the corruption economy knows a very high pressure coming from the environment 
where it exists; a pressure that varies in degree in direct connection to the intensity of the 
anticorruption measures.  
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The economics of corruption represents, in the broad sense, a “relation state- society” and 
it conceives and describes the “deviations” from the ideal state that occur as effects of 
corruption (Karasulu, 2003, 61).  
Matei (2006, 10-11) presents an extension of the model. 
As such, we will presume the existence of more opportunities for corruption, n, for each 
of those being settled a price, respectively, c1,  c2, … ,  cn. 
The line of supply as the line of demand will have vectorial expressions, as those that 
follow: 
 
( ) cδγcS •+=          (6) 
 
( ) cβαcD •−=         (7) 
 
where  ( ) ( ) ,,.......,,,... 2121 tmtm αααγγγ =>=
αγ
  
 
( ) ( ) 0,0,,
1
,1
1
,1 ≥≥==
≤≤
≤≤
≤≤
≤≤ ij
nj
miij
nj
miij ββδ ij
δβδ
             and 
( )tnccc ....,, 21=
c
 
Following the procedure used in determining the balance expression (3), we will find a 
balance condition, of a matrix shape, as it appears below: 
 
( ) γαcδβ * −=•+         (8) 
A qualitative analysis of the relation (8) and its interpretation in the light presented in this 
paper lead us to the following conclusions: 
 
1) ( ) 0de
t
nm
≠+==
δβ,γ
,
α
 the balance price of corruption is zero and, 
practically, the corruption market does not exist. 
 
2) ( ) 0de
t
nm
≠+=〉
δβ,,γα
, there is a system of balance prices of the 
opportunities for corruption, given by the expression: 
 
( ) ( )γαδβc 1* −+= −         (9) 
The supply of corruption will be: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )γαδβδγcS 1* −+•+= −        (10) 
and the demand of corruption becomes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )γαδββαcD 1* −+•−= −        (11) 
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Similar to the interpretations presented in the paper by Gamboa – Cavazos (2006), the 
structure of the market where public agents operate will be determined by vectorial 
parameters:  and 
γ
, while the structure of the market where the firms operate will be 
connected to the matrix shaped parameters  and .  
 
3)   ( ) mranknm =+〈〉 δβγα ,,  
In these conditions, the balance price is not unique and, in certain conditions it may raise 
the problem of determining an optimum for the corruption market. 
 
4)   ( ) nranknm =+〉〉 δβγα ,,  may appear in non-balance situations, when 
there is not a balance price or a unique one. The variety of situations that may be taken 
into account may fundament other types of relations possible to influence the corruption 
market balance.  
 
 
II.2.2 Models for assessing the anti-corruption strategies developed by the World Bank 
 
II.2.2.1 A Simple Evaluation Framework – Huther-Shah Model 
 
The model described below is broadly presented in Huther and Shah (2000, 2-8). 
The economic support of the proposed assessment framework consists in an adapted 
version of the cost-benefit analysis. We also find additional considerations on the use of 
the cost-benefit analysis in view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies in Matei and 
Matei (2009). 
Coming back to Huther and Shah (2000) paper, the core ideas will be synthesised below. 
Focusing their entire approach on the corruption aspects in the development programmes 
achieved with World Bank assistance, the authors propose an assessment framework 
based on “the incentives for opportunistic behaviour by public officials” (Huther and 
Shah, 2000, 2). 
 
In order to make distinction between grand corruption and societies without corruption, 
to a large  extent, the authors take into consideration the conditions where the officials 
search or accept corruption: 
 the expected gains exceed the estimated costs for achieving a corruption act; 
 little weight is placed on the costs that corruption imposes on others. 
Those two conclusions have the characteristics of hypotheses, substantiating the cost-
benefit analysis, referring to: 
 public officials’ self-interest to participate in a corruption act only when they 
expect a positive net benefit for the transaction assumed by the corruption act; 
 the implementation of  anti-corruption strategies will reduce the expected gains 
and will increase the sanctions for corrupt behaviour. 
Therefore, the authors conclude: “anti- corruption programs must change the cost-benefit 
calculations of public officials who believe that the expected net benefits of corruption 
are positive” (Huther and Shah, 2000, 2-3). 
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The above statements may be formalised in the relation: 
 
E(B) = n x E(G) – prob [P] x [P] > 0      (12) 
 
where:  E is the expectations operator; 
  n is number of corrupt transactions; 
  G is the gain from the corrupt transaction; 
  Prob [P] is the probability of paying a penalty; 
P is the penalty for the corrupt activity. 
 
The relation (12) becomes essential for the assessment of anti-corruption strategies, 
determining the mechanisms that influence the corruption level: 
 reducing the number of transactions involving public officials; 
 reducing the possibilities of gains for each transaction; 
 increasing the probability to pay penalties/sanctions for corrupt behaviour. 
The factors influencing each element of the cost-benefit analysis are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 The influence of anti-corruption programs on officials’ cost-benefit analysis 
 
Number of 
Corrupt 
Transactions 
Gross Gains from 
Corruption 
 
Probability of 
Paying 
Penalty 
Magnitude 
of Penalty 
 
Actions Not 
Influencing Cost 
Benefit Analysis 
Bureaucratic 
Culture – 
Streamlining 
Services 
Economic Reform 
– 
Improving 
Competitive 
Environment 
Anti- 
Corruption 
Agencies 
 
Rationalization 
of 
laws 
 
Raising 
Awareness of 
Public through 
Seminars 
Creating or 
Raising 
Public Service 
Standards 
Scaling Down 
Individual Public 
Projects 
 
Parliamentary 
Oversight 
 
 
Public Opinion 
Surveys 
 
Reducing Public 
Employment 
Bureaucratic 
Culture 
Ombudsman 
 
Raising Public 
Sector Wages 
Reducing Public 
Sector Size 
Referenda on Large 
Public Projects 
Financial 
Accountability 
 
Reducing Wage 
Compression 
Financial 
Liberalization 
 
Media 
Independence 
  
Increasing 
Transparency 
 
Judicial 
Independence 
  
Decentralization 
of 
Public Services 
 
Citizen 
Participation 
 
  
Economic Reform 
– Privatization 
 
Rule of Law 
 
  
  
Ethics Office 
  
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 5) 
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In view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies, the multiple objectives and actions 
enumerated in Table 2.1, Huther and Shah (2000, 6) formulate two questions: 
 how to establish the priorities of anti-corruption campaign; 
 which actions should be used to meet those targets. 
The answer may be substantiated differently. 
From economic point of view, the priority actions should combat the reduction of welfare 
caused by corruption. 
 
The authors state that operationalisation of such criteria of prioritization is difficult due to 
the fact that often the quantification of losses due to corruption is impossible and large 
losses are the result of multiple causes, including governance failure.  
Therefore, prioritization of anti-corruption activities should  rely on analysis of  
economic, political and bureaucratic conditions of every state. 
 
Among the reasons for prioritization of the above-mentioned anti-corruption activities, 
Huther and Shah (2000, 7) present a quite diverse list: 
 using the public opinion survey; 
 reducing the size of public sector; 
 increasing financial accountability; 
 bureaucratic culture; 
 decentralization; 
 media independence; 
 judicial independence; 
 citizen participation. 
 
II.2.2.2  OED methodology adapted in view to assess the anti-corruption strategies 
 
The same authors, Huther and Shah (2000, 8-12) present a new instrument for assessing 
the anti-corruption strategies, based on the methodology for assessing the development of 
states, achieved by Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and described by World 
Bank (2000). 
The methodology is based on the use of four key criteria: relevance, efficacy, efficiency 
and sustainability. Tavistock Institute (2003) uses similar criteria and we find their 
application for assessing the local development in Matei, Matei and Savulescu (2010, 25-
58). 
In a brief description, in general terms, the mentioned criteria comprise: 
 relevance – it establishes a connection in a certain strategy and explicit objectives 
of a policy adopted by public decision. The evaluation of relevance is qualitative 
to a great extent. 
 efficacy may incorporate both qualitative and quantitative evaluations when 
analysing if the objectives stated in a development policy were achieved, the 
adequacy of the chosen solutions as well as the influence of external factors. 
 efficiency, usually, takes into consideration an economic evaluation, taking into 
consideration the costs associated, reported to the outcomes. 
 sustainability also uses qualitative evaluations, establishing the extent to which 
the impact of a policy meets the overall needs, the social, economic, political 
needs of community and/or state. 
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Referring to the anti-corruption strategies, Schacter and Shah (2000) sustain that the 
analysis on their relevance combines two factors: technical relevance and welfare 
relevance. “Technical relevance refers to the impact of specific activities on the incidence 
of corruption and the welfare relevance relates to the relative importance, for growth and 
poverty reduction of a particular type of corruption” (Huther and Shah, 2000, 8). 
 
Taking into consideration the governance quality, (Huther and Shah, 1998; Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Loboton, 1999), quantified by “weak”, “fair”, “good”, Table 2.2. 
presents an assessment of the relevance of various anti-corruption programs. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Ratings on Relevance of a Menu of Anti-corruption Programs 
 
Country’s Quality of Governance Program   
Weak Fair Good 
Comments 
 
Raising public awareness of 
corruption through seminars 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium In countries with weak governance, corrupt 
practices and agents are generally well 
known. 
Raising awareness of public 
officials through seminars 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium Public officials may be aware of corruption 
but unwilling and/or unable to take action 
due to incentive problems in countries with 
weak governance. 
Anti-corruption 
agencies / 
Ombudsman 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium With endemic corruption, anti-corruption 
agencies or ombudsman may actually 
extort rents. Positive influence if preconditions 
for good governance exist. 
Ethics office Not 
relevant 
Low Medium Positive influence may be limited to 
societies with good governance. 
Raising Public Sector 
wages 
 
Negligible Low Medium May have positive impact on petty 
corruption but little impact on grand 
corruption. Negative impact if part of 
problem is excessive public employment. 
Reducing Wage Compression 
 
Negligible Negl. Negligible More relevant as an incentive mechanism 
for career development. May increase 
corruption if the public sector viewed as 
lucrative career option by greedy elements 
of society. 
Merit based civil 
service 
Low Medium High May be derailed by bureaucratic processes 
in highly corrupt societies. 
Public Opinion 
Surveys 
 
Low Medium Medium Public opinion surveys have served as a 
useful tool in articulating citizens’ 
concerns (e.g. Bangalore scorecard). 
Financial 
accountability 
Low Low Medium Medium appropriate when democratic 
accountability and a substantial 
accounting/bookkeeping infrastructure 
with some integrity are in place. 
Parliamentary 
oversight 
Low Medium Medium Parliamentary oversight can be helpful but 
parliamentary micro-management not an 
effective form of governance. 
Reducing Public 
Employment 
Medium Low Low May reduce opportunities for corruption . 
Decentralization Medium Low Low May improve accountability and may 
increase sense of social purpose for public 
officials. 
Client-based civil 
service / Bureaucratic 
culture 
Medium Medium Low Success depends upon service delivery 
orientation of public service, reinforced by 
accountability for results. 
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Economic policy 
reform 
High Medium Low Reduces potential corruption by shifting 
decision-making to the private sector. 
Media and judicial 
independence, citizen 
participation 
High Medium Low Allows for detection, followed by 
accountability. 
Reducing Public 
Sector Size 
 
High Medium Low By reducing the number of government 
activities, officials can focus on primary 
objectives of the state. 
Rule of law High Medium Low Essential for any progress. 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 9-10) 
 
 
In view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies, efficacy will require a measurement of 
the effect of a certain set of anti-corruption activities on the level of corruption or 
corrupted activity. 
On the other hand, an anti-corruption strategy will be considered efficient when it 
generates maximum reduction in the corruption incidence (good targeting), associated 
with welfare gains obtained with reduced costs. 
Concerning sustainability, the anti-corruption activities are sustainable if they produce 
changes in the expectations on public officials’ responsibilities. 
 
Table 2.3 presents a relevant synthesis on the significance of the four criteria for 
assessing the anti-corruption strategies. 
 
         Table 2.3: Summary of Proposed Rating Factors for Anti-Corruption Programs 
 
Relevance  Program objectives consistent with country’s development priorities, 
with Bank strategy 
 Program design underpinned by analytical work that recognizes country 
specific public sector mission and values, opportunities and constraints 
and an informed view of potential impacts of alternative actions 
 Judgments as to (a) the degree to which the anti-corruption programs 
were targeted to corruption drivers; (b) the relationship between those 
drivers, corruption and welfare outcomes. 
Efficacy  The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or expected 
to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance in curtailing 
corruption. 
 Judgments to be made about the degree to which Bank supported 
interventions have (i) reduced , (ii) had no impact, or (iii) led to an 
increase in, levels of various forms of corruption in the country. As a 
proxy focus on the relationship between Bank supported interventions 
and changes in key corruption drivers. 
 
Efficiency • generates most reductions in corruption and associated welfare gains for 
the least cost 
• targets corruption that has large costs 
Sustainability  the resilience to risk of net benefit flows over time based upon an 
assessment of political, economic, financial , social and external 
influences 
 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 11) 
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The two instruments proposed by the World Bank for assessing the anti-corruption 
strategies should be accompanied, each time, by better knowledge about the realities in 
every state. In view of integrating those anti-corruption strategies in the strategies aimed 
at improving the governance quality, preliminary conclusions are configured and 
presented synthetically by the same authors in Table 2.4. 
 
          Table 2.4: Effective Anti-Corruption Programs Based on Governance Quality 
 
Incidence of 
Corruption 
Governance 
Quality 
Priorities of Anti-Corruption Efforts 
(Based on Drivers of corruption) 
High Poor Establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and 
accountability; limit government interventions to focus on core mandate 
Medium Fair Decentralization and economic policy reforms; results-oriented 
management and evaluation; introduction of incentives for competitive 
public service delivery 
Low Good Explicit anti-corruption programs such as anti-corruption agencies; 
strengthen financial management; raising public and officials awareness; 
no bribery pledges, fry big fish, etc. 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 12) 
 
II.2.3  Models developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (BERD) 
– Steves – Rousso Model  
 
Steves and Rousso (2003, 4-7) present the methodology for assessing the anti-corruption 
strategies, developed by EBRD. In view to respond to concrete needs for assessing the 
anti-corruption strategies in former European communist states, the above authors’ 
approach is correlated with other EBRD initiatives; EBRD together with World Bank 
achieved several rounds of Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys 
(BEEPS). If we add the periodical evaluations, usually annual ones, on the level of 
corruption, achieved by World Bank, Transparency International or other transnational 
actors, we have a complex set of instruments, providing the possibility to assess the 
impact of anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The below presentation follows closely the study of Steves – Rousso (2003); based on the 
main conclusions from the first and second BEEPS rounds, they have conceptualised and 
coded “a matrix of anti-corruption activities”  (Steves and Rousso, 2003, 5). 
Those activities are divided in three general categories, as follows: 
 omnibus reform programmes; 
 new legislation targeted at anti-corruption; 
 accession to international covenants and membership in international anti-
corruption coalitions.  
 
The above authors have developed, for each category, a grading system, representing the 
basis of calculation  for an index specific for each category: Omnibus Index (OI), Legal 
Index (LI) and Conventions Index (CI). 
Thus an anti-corruption matrix is obtained. Table 2.5 presents its variables and weights. 
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Table 2.5: Anti-corruption matrix variables and weighting 
 
 Percentage of 
Intensity Index 
Intensity Index                                                             
{ IIA-C} 
 
100.0 
         of which: 
 
 
Omnibus Index                                                                
{ OI} 
   33.3 
National anti-corruption strategy                                [ 
OI1] 
             11.1 
          Adopted                                                               
[OI1.1] 
                      5.56 
          Involved NGOS                                                    
[OI1.2] 
                      2.78 
          Multi-branch                                                       
[OI1.3] 
                      2.78 
Anti-corruption action plan                                            
[OI2] 
 
            11.1 
          Adopted                                                               
[OI2.1] 
                      5.56 
          Involved NGOS                                                    
[OI2.2] 
                      2.78 
          Multi-branch                                                       
[OI2.3] 
                      2.78 
Anti-corruption commission or ombudsmen               
[OI3] 
 
            11.1 
          Established                                                          
[OI3.1] 
                      5.56 
          Involved NGOS                                                    
[OI3.2] 
                      1.11 
          Multi-branch                                                       
[OI3.3] 
                      1.11 
          Independent                                                        
[OI3.4] 
                      3.33 
  
 
Legal Index                                                                          
{LI} 
  33.3 
Civil Service Law                                                               
[LI.1] 
             5.56 
Financial Disclosure Law                                                 
[LI.2] 
             5.56 
Public Procurement Law                                                 
[LI.3] 
             5.56 
Freedom of Information Law                                         
[LI.4] 
             5.56 
Party Finance Law                                                            
[LI.5] 
             5.56 
Anti-Money Laundering Law                                           
[LI.6] 
             5.56 
  
 
Conventions Index*                                                          
{CI} 
 
  33.3 
Stability Pact anti-Corruption Initiative                       
[CI.1] 
             5.56 
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OECD Anti-Bribery Convention                                     
[CI.2] 
             5.56 
COE GRECO                                                                       
[CI.3] 
            5.56 
COE Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and  
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime                   
[CI.4] 
 
 
 
            5.56 
COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption            
[CI.5] 
             5.56 
COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption                    
[CI.6] 
             5.56 
*In the non-Stability Pact countries, the other five indicators in this Index represent 6.67 per cent of the 
Intensity Index. 
 
Source:  Steves and Rousso (2003, 6). 
 
 
At the same time, each category was divided in several specific criteria, based on specific 
activities in every country. 
 
Consequently, for the activities specific to OI, an assessment is proposed. 
OI.1  the design and publication of an anti-corruption strategy;  
OI.2  the development of an implementing anti-corruption action plan; 
OI.3  the establishment of a national anti-corruption commission, ombudsman or  
similar authority, aimed to coordinate  and to monitor the achievement of  
objectives and activities from the national anti-corruption strategy. 
 
For each criterion in the matrix,  “1” was coded if the respective anti-corruption measures 
were introduced and “0” was coded if contrary. 
 
As remarked in Table 2.5, these three major components of the OI  are weighted equally. 
 
The authors considered not only a formal consignment of the activities mentioned but 
also some aspects concerning their design, content and operationalization. 
Thus, for each criterion there are sub criteria, as also remarked in Table 2.5. They refer 
mainly to: 
 involving the non governmental organizations in developing the anti-corruption 
activities; 
 complex structure of the strategy comprising several governmental branches or 
ministries such as that of justice, administration and home affairs etc. 
 formal independence of anti-corruption commission/authority before the 
government. 
 
Their weights were designed differently, as results from Table 2.5. 
 
For the activities specific to LI, concerning a new  anti-corruption legislation, six criteria 
were developed on achieving, implementing or amending six laws, chosen on the basis of  
a careful observation of the specificity of the regulatory framework in the states 
mentioned.  
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 That specificity refers concretely to the lack of efficiency  of some laws, even if they 
were achieved during the first half of the 1990s. The laws refer to:  
LI.1    civil service law; 
LI.2   financial disclosure law  
LI.3  public procurement law; 
LI.4  freedom of information law;  
LI.5  political party financing law;  
LI.6   anti-money laundering law. 
 
“These key legislative reforms have thus consistently been highlighted by bodies such as 
the OECD, international financial institutions, and domestic and international non-
governmental organisations as the areas most likely to reduce the incentives and 
opportunities for both administrative corruption and state capture” (Steves and Rousso, 
2003, 7). 
Each of these criteria are weighted equally. 
 
Concerning CI, it evaluates the commitment of the states analysed to ratify and respect 
international conventions and standards, as well as their participation in international 
bodies and coalitions. 
 
CI.1.  the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI); 
CI.2.   the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; 
CI.3.  COE’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); 
CI.4.  the COE’s Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the  
            Proceeds from Crime; 
CI.5.  the Council of Europe’s (COE) Criminal Convention on Corruption. 
CI.6.  COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 
 
To refine this index,  1/3 was given for signing the instrument, 2/3 for signing and 
ratifying, and  “1” if the document has been signed, ratified and has entered into force. 
 
By aggregating these three indicators, an overall index will be obtained  (Intensity Index 
for anti-corruption, IIA-C), in view to evaluate the impact of the anti-corruption strategies 
in each state as well as to make comparisons and correlations with adjacent processes and 
phenomena, specific for the states analysed. 
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III. An example of empirical study on assessing the national anti-corruption 
strategies and government performance 
 
III.1. Assessing the anti-corruption strategies 
 
III.1.1. Dynamic matrix of anti-corruption activities 
 
In sub chapter II.2.3., we presented the Steves-Rousso model for assessing the anti-
corruption strategies, model based on anti-corruption matrix. 
The analysis presented by Steves and Rousso (2003) referred to former communist states 
in transition and it covered the time horizon: 1999-2002. The quantification of activities 
in matrix had a single value for the whole period of time, determining us to consider this 
method as a static one. 
In our view, the anti-corruption strategies and the whole ensemble accompanying them, 
represent the basis of a developing process in close accordance with the other processes 
characterising the reforms of societies in transition. 
 
Therefore, the dynamic matrix that we propose, will have variable annual  
quantifications, as follows: 
 a series of criteria – OI.1.1, OI.2.1, OI.3.1, OI.3.4 – as well as CI1-6 are quasi 
constant during the period analysed; they may vary only when the activities 
quantified are amended, modified or replaced with new ones. In this situation, it is 
valid the principle of overlapping the effects. 
 the other criteria vary annually in a linear way, since the year when they were 
adopted or integrated in the national legislative and institutional framework. Their 
values are cumulative and take into consideration eventual amendments, changes 
or replacements; it is also valid the principle of overlapping the effects. 
 the dynamic matrix will have the same structure as the matrix proposed by Steves 
and Rousso and the weights of each criterion are maintained. 
 
III.1.2. Empirical analysis of the national anti-corruption strategies in some South-
Eastern European states 
 
The analysis presented below will have illustrative character in view of using the 
dynamic anti-corruption matrix. 
The sample of analysed states comprises three EU Member States (Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia), an acceding state (Croatia) and other two South-Eastern European states 
(Moldova and Serbia). The sample also covers the Western Balkans as well as the former 
Soviet Union, respectively Yugoslavia Federation. 
The period analysed is 1999-2008. 
Annex 1 presents the documentary database and the sources used and Annex 2 comprises 
synthetically the activities for achieving the dynamic anti-corruption matrix in the above-
mentioned states. 
Annex 3 presents the effective calculation of IIA-C as well as of primary indices – OI, LI 
and CI.  
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The overall remark is that the statistic variables associated both to primary indices and 
composite index IIA-C have increasing values, fact which highlights the developing 
character of processes characterising the anti-corruption activities. 
The rhythms for the achievement and implementation of anti-corruption strategies are 
different. The calculation of statistic correlations reveals very high coefficients of 
correlation (between 0.939 (SI/HR) and 0.993 (MD/BG)); this fact is natural, taking into 
consideration the objectives of European integration of the respective states and 
compliance with the transnational anti-corruption frameworks, promoted by World Bank, 
OECD and of course EU. 
We also remark the effects of enforcing the anti-corruption strategies in their correlation 
with the index of control of corruption (KKM), developed by the World Bank. 
 
 
                                          Table 3.1: Correlations II-AC/KKM 
 
   
 
BG_KKM 
 
 
HR_KKM 
 
 
MD_KKM 
 
 
RO_KKM 
 
SE_KKM 
 
SI_KKM 
BG_II_AC Pearson Correlation .306 .562 -.308 .863(**) .929(**) .201 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .091 .387 .001 .000 .577 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
HR_II_AC Pearson Correlation .385 .663(*) -.420 .804(**) .892(**) .093 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .272 .036 .227 .005 .001 .798 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
MD_II_AC Pearson Correlation .341 .586 -.339 .862(**) .906(**) .204 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .335 .075 .338 .001 .000 .571 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
RO_II_AC Pearson Correlation .348 .602 -.356 .801(**) .901(**) .146 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .065 .313 .005 .000 .688 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SE_II_AC Pearson Correlation .363 .617 -.376 .829(**) .890(**) .120 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .302 .057 .284 .003 .001 .742 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SI_II_AC Pearson Correlation .340 .487 -.251 .848(**) .921(**) .375 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .336 .154 .485 .002 .000 .286 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The statistic correlations, described in Table 3.1 for 1999-2008 are relevant and 
demonstrate inverse negative correlations (MD, -0.339) or small positive correlations 
(BG, 0.306; SI, 0.375) or high correlations (HR, 0.663; RO, 0.801; SE, 0.890). 
 
The conclusions of such findings are more profound and may lead to inadequacy of the 
anti-corruption strategies in some states, revealing an inappropriate perception of 
corruption as well as to inadequacy of the instrument of analysis. In fact, concerning this 
last conclusion, an explanation may be the difficulty of collecting data and information 
that reflect the actual reality in the states analysed. 
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III.2. The impact of corruption on government performance 
 
The analyses presented are relevant for our study and they are described in Matei and 
Matei (2009, 23-25). We present them in the current paper in view to highlight and 
support the objective of our paper. 
For the mentioned period, the analysis uses indices of perception of corruption (TI) 
calculated by Transparency International, Global Integrity (GI), the index of control of 
corruption (KKM) calculated by World Bank, the index of economic freedom (IEF) 
calculated by Heritage Foundation as well as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
The sample comprises the states: Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), 
Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Moldova (MD), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia 
(SI), Turkey (TR) and Ukraine (UA). 
The analyses reveal that the single interesting regressions in view of the current study are 
those using TI or GI (or KKM) as dependent variables and IEF and GDP as independent 
variables. In order to emphasise statistically the influence of the European integration 
process on public integrity, we introduced an independent variable “dummy”, called EU, 
awarding the following values for each state during the analysed period: 
 
 
                1,  if the respective state is EU Member State 
EU =  
                0,  in the opposite case 
 
EU variable introduced in the above regressions will underline quantitatively the 
influence of the integration process on the indices of public integrity. 
 
For TI, we obtain: 
 
TI = - 2.944  +   0.759 IEF  +   0.606 Log GDP + ε1     (13) 
          (0.219)    (0.371)            (0,699) 
or 
 
TI = - 1.122 +   0.654 IEF + 0.287 Log GDP + 0.276 UE + ε3   (14) 
          (0.832)    (0.485)        (0,877)                  (0.701) 
 
In both situations, the significance levels of the coefficients are in parentheses. 
Unfortunately, lacking comprehensive series of data, for the other regression, the 
significance levels of the coefficients are null. 
Both expressions (13) and (14) help us to determine, approximately, possible influences 
of the governance indices on public integrity, expressed by means of TI. 
As an example, for Romania, the increase by 0.5 of IEF index  will lead to an increase by 
0.33 of the index concerning perception of corruption, taking into consideration the 
influence of the European integration process, thus it results an increase by 0.4. 
In 2007, the year of Romania’s accession to the EU, the increase by 0.6 of the index 
concerning perception of corruption is due especially to the mentioned event (0.56), 
according to (14). 
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GDP growth influences significantly TI index only if it exceeds the annual mean of GDP 
evolution. Thus, for Romania, an increase by 1500$ of GDP will lead to an increase by 
0.0125 of TI index. Consequently, the index of economic freedom will have the most 
significant influence and EU index will have the most significant influence at the moment 
of accession of a state to the EU. 
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n
 
(la
w
 
o
f o
m
bu
ds
m
a
n
 
20
03
) 
 
 U
n
ifie
d 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 
Sy
st
em
 
a
ga
in
st
 
Cr
im
e 
O
n
 
Ju
n
e 
9,
 
20
06
 
th
re
e 
an
ti-
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s,
 
o
f t
he
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
ss
em
bl
y,
 
th
e 
Ca
bi
n
et
 
an
d 
th
e 
Su
pr
em
e 
Ju
di
ci
al
 
Co
u
n
ci
l 
sig
n
ed
 
an
 
ag
re
em
en
t t
o
 
co
o
rd
in
at
e 
th
ei
r 
ef
fo
rt
s 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 
in
 
sh
ar
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
o
n
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
sig
n
al
s 
o
f n
at
io
n
al
 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 
an
d 
de
te
ct
in
g 
th
e 
la
ps
es
 
in
 
th
e 
le
gi
sla
tio
n
 
al
lo
w
in
g 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
o
pp
o
rt
u
n
iti
es
.
 
 
 
Cr
o
at
ia
 
 
 
 
O
ffic
e 
for
 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
a
n
d 
O
rg
a
n
iz
ed
 
Cr
im
e 
(U
SK
O
K
) e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 
20
01
; 
-
 
U
SK
O
K
 
is 
an
 
au
to
n
o
m
o
u
s 
pr
o
se
cu
tio
n
 
se
rv
ic
e 
at
ta
ch
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
St
a
te
’
s 
At
to
rn
ey
 
O
ffic
e 
w
ith
 
its
 
ce
n
tr
al
 
o
ffi
ce
 
in
 
Za
gr
eb
 
; 
-
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
20
01
 
Ac
t o
n
 
th
e 
O
ffic
e 
for
 
Su
pp
re
ss
io
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
a
n
d 
O
rg
a
n
iz
ed
 
Cr
im
e 
w
er
e 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
04
 
an
d 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
in
 
M
ar
ch
 
20
05
.
 
 
St
a
te
 
Au
di
t O
ffic
e 
-
 
re
gu
la
te
s 
th
e 
au
di
t o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
s,
 
th
e 
au
di
t o
f f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s 
o
f 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t u
n
its
 
an
d 
lo
ca
l a
n
d 
re
gi
o
n
al
 
se
lf-
go
v
er
n
m
en
t u
n
its
; 
-
di
re
ct
ly
 
re
sp
o
n
sib
le
 
to
 
th
e 
Cr
o
at
ia
n
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t 
 
 
 
O
m
bu
ds
m
a
n
 
-
 
ha
s 
n
o
 
di
re
ct
 
co
m
pe
te
n
ce
 
in
 
re
la
tio
n
 
to
 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
an
d 
de
te
ct
io
n
 
o
f c
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
,
 
bu
t i
s 
en
tr
u
st
ed
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
ci
tiz
en
s’
 
rig
ht
s 
in
 
ca
se
s 
o
f 
m
al
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
 
o
f a
ct
s 
ta
ke
n
 
by
 
St
at
e 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
 
o
r 
o
th
er
 
bo
di
es
 
v
es
te
d 
w
ith
 
pu
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
y 
M
o
ld
o
v
a 
 
 
Co
o
rd
in
a
tio
n
 
Co
u
n
ci
l i
n
 
th
e 
Is
su
es
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Co
m
ba
t  
(20
01
) 
-
 
co
-
o
rd
in
at
es
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
co
m
ba
t, 
n
at
io
n
al
 
se
cu
rit
y,
 
pu
bl
ic
 
in
te
re
st
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
ci
tiz
en
s 
rig
ht
s 
an
d 
fre
ed
o
m
s.
 
 
 
 
G
en
er
a
l P
ro
se
cu
to
r’
s 
O
ffic
e 
 
 M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f th
e 
In
te
ri
o
r 
 
 Ce
n
te
r 
for
 
Co
m
ba
tin
g 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Cr
im
es
 
a
n
d 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(20
02
) 
-
 
a 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 
la
w
-
en
fo
rc
em
en
t b
o
dy
 
de
sig
n
ed
 
to
 
pr
ev
en
t, 
de
te
ct
,
 
in
v
es
tig
at
e 
an
d 
su
pp
re
ss
 
fin
an
ci
al
,
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
an
d 
ta
x
 
cr
im
es
; 
-
 
co
u
n
te
ra
ct
s 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
an
d 
n
ep
o
tis
m
; 
-
 
 
in
v
es
tig
at
es
 
m
o
n
ey
 
la
u
n
de
rin
g.
 
 
 
Ce
n
te
r 
for
 
Co
m
ba
tin
g 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Cr
im
es
 
a
n
d 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
,
 
D
ep
a
rt
m
en
t fo
r 
Co
m
ba
tin
g 
a
n
d 
Pr
ev
en
tin
g 
M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
(SP
CS
B)
 
a 
fin
an
ci
al
 
in
te
lli
ge
n
ce
 
u
n
it.
 
 
 M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f L
o
ca
l P
u
bl
ic
 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tio
n
 
-
 
re
sp
o
n
sib
le
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
su
pe
rv
isi
o
n
 
o
f l
o
ca
l a
u
th
o
rit
ie
s 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
pu
bl
ic
 
pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t c
o
n
tr
ac
ts
,
 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
rv
ic
es
,
 
gr
an
ts
 
o
f p
er
m
its
 
an
d 
lic
en
ce
s 
an
d 
le
tti
n
g 
o
u
t p
ro
pe
rt
y.
 
 
 Co
u
rt
 
o
f A
u
di
to
rs
 
 
 Ce
n
tr
a
l M
o
n
ito
rin
g 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
 
-
 
re
ce
iv
es
 
as
se
t d
ec
la
ra
tio
n
s 
fro
m
 
hi
gh
-
ra
n
ki
n
g 
pu
bl
ic
 
o
ffi
ci
al
s.
 
 
Ce
n
tr
e 
for
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
Ri
gh
ts
 
-
 
o
m
bu
ds
m
an
 
in
st
itu
tio
n
.
 
 
 Na
tio
n
a
l B
a
n
k 
-
 
pr
o
v
id
es
 
de
ta
ils
 
o
n
 
al
l b
an
k 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
fo
r 
in
v
es
tig
at
io
n
s.
 
 
 Ce
n
tr
e 
for
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
Tr
a
ffic
ki
n
g 
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R
o
m
an
ia
 
 
 
Na
tio
n
a
l C
o
m
m
itt
ee
 
for
 
th
e 
Cr
im
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
(N
CC
P)
 
Se
t u
p 
by
 
th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t i
n
 
Ju
ly
 
20
01
 
as
 
an
 
in
te
r-
m
in
ist
er
ia
l o
rg
an
ism
 
co
m
pr
isi
n
g 
m
in
ist
er
s 
an
d 
se
n
io
r 
o
ffi
ci
al
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
au
th
o
rit
y 
o
f t
he
 
Pr
im
e 
–
M
in
ist
er
.
 
Th
is 
in
st
itu
tio
n
 
im
pl
em
en
ts
 
th
e 
N
at
io
n
al
 
Pl
an
 
fo
r 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
an
d 
th
e 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
ct
io
n
 
Pl
an
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
.
 
 
 
 Th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f J
u
st
ic
e 
 
 
 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
ti-
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 
(N
AD
) i
s 
a 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
w
ith
 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n
al
ity
 
fu
n
ct
io
n
in
g 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
Pr
o
se
cu
to
rs
’
 
O
ffi
ce
 
at
ta
ch
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
H
ig
h 
Co
u
rt
 
o
f C
as
sa
tio
n
 
an
d 
Ju
st
ic
e 
sp
ec
ia
liz
ed
 
in
 
in
v
es
tig
at
in
g 
an
d 
pr
o
se
cu
tin
g 
se
rio
u
s 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
o
ffe
n
ce
s.
 
It 
w
as
 
se
t u
p 
by
 
th
e 
re
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
in
 
20
05
 
o
f t
he
 
Fo
rm
er
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
n
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Pr
o
se
cu
to
rs
’
 
O
ffi
ce
 
w
hi
ch
 
w
as
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
in
 
20
02
.
 
 
 
 An
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
G
en
er
a
l D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 
(D
G
A)
,
 
M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f In
te
ri
o
r 
a
n
d 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tiv
e 
Re
for
m
 
is 
th
e 
o
n
ly
 
po
lic
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
n
ce
 
to
 
in
v
es
tig
at
e 
ca
se
s 
o
f c
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
n
el
 
o
f th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y.
 
 
Th
e 
Co
u
rt
 
o
f A
u
di
t e
x
er
ci
se
s 
co
n
tr
o
l o
n
 
th
e 
fo
rm
at
io
n
,
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
 
an
d 
u
se
 
o
f 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
so
u
rc
es
 
o
f t
he
 
st
at
e 
an
d 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
o
r.
 
 
 
 
Na
tio
n
a
l C
o
n
tr
o
l A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 
-
 
co
o
rd
in
at
es
 
th
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
o
f a
ll 
co
n
tr
o
l 
bo
di
es
 
in
sid
e 
m
in
ist
rie
s 
an
d 
ce
n
tr
al
 
pu
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s,
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
in
te
rn
al
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
co
n
tr
o
l w
ith
in
 
m
in
ist
rie
s 
an
d 
sp
ec
ia
liz
ed
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
bo
di
es
.
 
 
 Th
e 
Pr
im
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
Ch
a
n
ce
lle
ry
 
 
 Pe
o
pl
e’
s 
A
dv
o
ca
te
 
A
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
O
m
bu
ds
m
a
n
 
Ac
t (
M
ar
ch
 
19
97
)  
 
 Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l O
ffic
e 
o
n
 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
Fi
gh
t o
f M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
Se
rb
ia
 
 
 
An
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Co
u
n
ci
l- 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
in
 
20
01
 
 
 Th
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
for
 
No
rm
a
tiv
e 
Af
fai
rs
 
a
n
d 
In
te
rn
a
tio
-
 
n
a
l C
o
o
pe
ra
tio
n
 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f J
u
st
ic
e) 
 
Th
e 
An
ti-
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Ag
en
cy
 
w
ill
 
be
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
 
o
n
 
 
1O
ct
o
be
r 
20
07
.
 
 
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
se
cu
to
r’
s 
O
ffic
e 
-
 
an
 
au
to
n
o
m
o
u
s 
st
at
e 
au
th
o
rit
y 
th
at
 
sh
al
l 
pr
o
se
cu
te
 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
 
o
f c
rim
in
al
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
pu
n
ish
ab
le
 
o
ffe
n
ce
s,
 
an
d 
sh
al
l, 
th
ro
u
gh
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
lit
ie
s 
cr
ea
te
d 
by
 
la
w
,
 
pr
o
te
ct
 
co
n
st
itu
tio
n
al
ity
 
an
d 
le
ga
lit
y 
an
d 
sh
al
l 
u
n
de
rt
ak
e 
o
th
er
 
ac
tio
n
s 
as
 
em
po
w
er
ed
 
by
 
la
w
.
 
 
 
 
Th
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
for
 
Bu
dg
et
 
In
sp
ec
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
In
te
rn
a
l A
u
di
t 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f F
in
a
n
ce
) 
-
ta
sk
ed
 
to
 
re
po
rt
 
its
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
o
n
 
in
sp
ec
tio
n
s 
co
n
du
ct
ed
 
an
d 
m
ak
es
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n
s 
to
 
th
e 
M
in
ist
er
 
o
f 
Fi
n
an
ce
.
 
 
 
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t O
ffic
e 
 
-
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
u
n
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 
18
 
o
f t
he
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t L
aw
 
(O
ffi
ci
al
 
G
az
et
te
 
39
/2
00
2) 
as
 
an
 
in
de
pe
n
de
n
t g
o
v
er
n
m
en
ta
l 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
ac
co
u
n
ta
bl
e 
di
re
ct
ly
 
to
 
th
e 
Pr
im
e 
M
in
ist
er
.
 
 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
Bo
a
rd
 
for
 
Re
so
lv
in
g 
Co
n
flic
t o
f 
In
te
re
st
 
 
Sl
o
v
en
ia
 
 
 
Co
m
m
is
si
o
n
 
for
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(20
04
.
) 
Th
e 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
 
be
ca
m
e 
fu
lly
 
o
pe
ra
tio
n
al
 
o
n
 
1 
O
ct
o
be
r 
20
04
.
 
 
  
Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l B
u
re
a
u
 
o
f In
ve
st
ig
a
tio
n
 
be
ca
m
e 
o
pe
ra
tio
n
al
 
o
n
 
1 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
20
10
.
 
Th
e 
B
u
re
au
 
is 
a 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 
cr
im
in
al
 
in
v
es
tig
at
io
n
 
u
n
it 
at
 
th
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 
le
v
el
 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
te
ct
io
n
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tig
at
io
n
 
o
f 
se
rio
u
s 
cr
im
in
al
 
o
ffe
n
ce
s,
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
cr
im
e 
an
d 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
an
d 
in
 
ce
rt
ai
n
 
ca
se
s 
o
rg
an
ise
d 
cr
im
e,
 
cy
be
rc
rim
e 
an
d 
m
o
re
 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
fo
rm
s 
o
f c
o
n
v
en
tio
n
al
 
cr
im
e.
 
 
 
O
ffic
e 
o
f th
e 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
se
cu
to
r 
 
 G
ro
u
p 
o
f P
u
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
se
cu
to
rs
 
for
 
Sp
ec
ia
l T
a
sk
s 
 
 
 M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f In
te
ri
o
r,
 
Cr
im
in
a
l P
o
lic
e 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
,
 
An
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
D
iv
isi
o
n
 
 
Co
u
rt
 
o
f A
u
di
t 
 
 M
in
is
tr
y 
o
f F
in
a
n
ce
,
 
O
ffic
e 
for
 
M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
-
 
a 
co
n
st
itu
tiv
e 
bo
dy
 
o
f t
he
,
 
w
hi
ch
 
st
ar
te
d 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
o
n
 
1 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
19
95
.
 
O
ffic
e 
for
 
M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
o
f S
lo
ve
n
ia
 
(19
95
) 
 
   
St
a
te
 
 
A
n
ti-
C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
 
 
Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
tic
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
by
 
D
ec
isi
o
n
 
N
o
.
 
67
1/
20
01
 
o
f t
he
 
Co
u
n
ci
l o
f M
in
ist
er
s,
 
an
d 
th
e 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
ta
l A
ct
io
n
 
Pl
an
 
fo
r 
its
 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
o
n
 
11
.
02
.
20
02
 
by
 
D
ec
isi
o
n
 
N
o
.
77
 
o
f t
he
 
Co
u
n
ci
l o
f M
in
ist
er
s.
 
 
Th
e 
A
ct
io
n
 
Pl
an
 
fo
r 
th
e 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
co
v
er
s 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
20
02
-
20
03
.
 
Th
e 
u
pd
at
e 
th
e 
A
ct
io
n
 
Pl
an
 
w
as
 
ef
fe
ct
ed
 
in
 
Se
pt
.
 
20
03
, 
fo
r 
pe
rio
d 
20
04
-
20
05
.
 
Th
e 
n
ew
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
for
 
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
,
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
Co
u
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
20
06
-
20
08
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
(12
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
20
06
).  
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
is 
as
 
a 
fo
u
n
di
n
g 
m
em
be
r 
o
f t
he
 
G
ro
u
p 
o
f E
u
ro
pe
an
 
St
at
es
 
o
f F
ig
ht
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
, 
G
R
EC
O
 
(1m
ay
 
19
99
). 
Cr
o
at
ia
 
 
Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l P
ro
gr
a
m
m
e 
Fo
r 
Fi
gh
t a
ga
in
st
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
w
ith
 
a
n
 
Ac
tio
n
 
Pl
a
n
 
co
ve
ri
n
g 
th
e 
pe
ri
o
d 
20
03
-
20
07
(A
pr
il 
20
02
). 
A
 
n
ew
 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Pr
o
gr
a
m
m
e 
20
06
-
20
08
.
 
Cr
o
at
ia
 
joi
n
ed
 
G
R
EC
O
 
in
 
20
00
.
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M
o
ld
o
v
a 
 
Na
tio
n
a
l S
tr
a
te
gy
 
for
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
Fi
gh
tin
g 
an
d 
th
e 
Ac
tio
n
 
Pl
a
n
 
(16
th
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
04
). 
Ce
n
tr
al
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
A
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n
 
R
ef
o
rm
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t i
n
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
05
.
 
Th
e 
n
ew
 
Ac
tio
n
 
Pl
a
n
 
fo
r 
20
06
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
29
de
c 
20
05
.
 
M
o
ld
o
v
a 
 
joi
n
ed
 
G
R
EC
O
 
o
n
 
28
 
Ju
n
e 
20
01
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
 
Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
tic
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
20
01
-
20
04
.
 
Th
e 
n
ew
 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
tic
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
20
05
 
-
20
07
 
(A
pr
il 
20
05
) 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
is 
as
 
a 
fo
u
n
di
n
g 
m
em
be
r 
o
f t
he
 
G
R
EC
O
 
(1m
ay
 
19
99
).  
Se
rb
ia
 
 
Th
e 
St
at
e 
U
n
io
n
 
o
f S
er
bi
a 
an
d 
M
o
n
te
n
eg
ro
 
 
joi
n
ed
 
G
R
EC
O
 
in
 
20
03
.
 
Th
e 
Se
rb
ia
n
 
An
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
ap
pr
o
v
ed
 
in
 
m
ay
 
20
05
 
an
d 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
de
c.
20
05
.
 
Th
e 
Na
tio
n
a
l J
u
di
ci
a
l S
tr
a
te
gy
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
m
ay
 
20
06
 
an
d 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
Ju
n
e 
20
06
.
 
Se
rb
ia
 
joi
n
ed
 
G
R
EC
O
 
o
n
 
1 
A
pr
il 
20
03
.
 
Sl
o
v
en
ia
 
 
Na
tio
n
a
l A
n
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
(ad
o
pt
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
Pa
rli
am
en
t i
n
 
20
04
). 
Re
so
lu
tio
n
 
for
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
04
.
 
Sl
o
v
en
ia
 
joi
n
ed
 
G
R
EC
O
 
in
 
19
99
.
 
   
St
a
te
 
A
n
ti-
C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Le
ga
l F
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
 
 
R
ad
ic
al
 
re
fo
rm
 
is 
u
n
de
rg
o
in
g 
sin
ce
 
20
05
: 
Ju
di
ci
a
l e
n
for
ce
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
; 
 
A
do
pt
io
n
 
o
f n
ew
 
Ci
vi
l P
ro
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
; 
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Co
m
m
er
ci
a
l R
eg
is
te
r 
(en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
Ju
ly
 
20
07
,
 
am
en
de
d 
20
08
); 
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Po
lit
ic
a
l P
a
rt
ie
s(2
00
1,
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
09
); 
 
Ne
w
 
Cr
im
in
a
l P
ro
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
 
(20
06
); 
 
Ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 
Ac
t (2
00
0,
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
02
,
 
20
05
, 
20
06
) ;
 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l C
o
de
 
(19
68
,
 
a
m
en
dm
en
ts
20
02
); 
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Fo
rfe
itu
re
 
to
 
th
e 
St
a
te
 
o
f P
ro
pe
rt
y 
Ac
qu
ir
ed
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
Cr
im
in
a
l A
ct
iv
ity
: 
th
e 
an
ti-
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f t
hi
s 
la
w
 
is 
se
en
 
in
 
er
ad
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
ca
u
se
s 
o
f c
rim
e,
 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
;  
M
ea
su
re
s 
Ag
a
in
st
 
M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
Ac
t (J
u
n
e 
19
96
,
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
o
n
 
n
o
v
.
20
07
); 
La
w
 
for
 
th
e 
Ci
vi
l S
er
va
n
t (
19
99
,
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
01
); 
 
Co
de
 
o
f E
th
ic
s 
for
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
O
ffic
ia
ls 
(20
07
); 
 
Bu
lg
a
ri
a
 
de
po
si
te
d 
its
 
in
st
ru
m
en
t o
f r
a
tifi
ca
tio
n
 
o
n
 
22
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
19
98
.
 
Th
e 
O
EC
D
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
m
ba
tin
g 
Br
ib
er
y 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
for
ce
 
o
n
 
15
 
Fe
br
u
a
ry
 
19
99
.
 
Th
e 
te
x
t o
f t
he
 
Co
n
v
en
tio
n
 
(B
u
lg
ar
ia
n
 
tr
an
sla
tio
n
) w
as
 
pr
o
m
u
lg
at
ed
 
in
 
“
St
at
e 
G
az
et
te
”
 
N
o
 
61
 
o
f 6
 
Ju
ly
 
19
99
;  
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tiv
e 
O
ffe
n
ce
s 
a
n
d 
Sa
n
ct
io
n
s 
(am
en
dm
en
ts
2 
1s
ep
t.2
00
5);
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Fo
rfe
itu
re
 
to
 
th
e 
St
a
te
 
o
f P
ro
ce
ed
s 
o
f C
ri
m
e 
(20
05
); 
 
A 
n
ew
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t (
ad
o
pt
ed
 
24
 
m
ar
ch
 
20
04
 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
1 
O
ct
o
be
r 
20
04
, 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
06
); 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Se
ct
o
r 
In
te
rn
a
l A
u
di
t S
ta
n
da
rd
s 
(ad
o
pt
ed
 
20
06
).  
 Ne
w
 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tiv
e 
Pr
o
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
 
(en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
Ju
ly
 
20
06
); 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
ra
tif
ie
d:
 
 
th
e 
Co
u
n
ci
l o
f E
u
ro
pe
 
Ci
v
il 
La
w
 
Co
n
v
en
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
,
 
o
n
 
8 
Ju
n
e 
20
00
;  
th
e 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g,
 
Se
a
rc
h,
 
Se
iz
u
re
 
a
n
d 
Co
n
fis
ca
tio
n
 
o
f th
e 
Pr
o
ce
ed
s 
fro
m
 
Cr
im
e,
 
o
n
 
2 
Ju
n
e 
19
93
; 
th
e 
U
n
ite
d 
Na
tio
n
s 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
a
ga
in
st
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
,
 
o
n
 
3 
A
u
gu
st
 
20
06
;  
th
e 
U
n
ite
d 
Na
tio
n
s 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
a
ga
in
st
 
Tr
a
n
sn
a
tio
n
a
l O
rg
a
n
iz
ed
 
Cr
im
e,
 
o
n
 
12
 
A
pr
il 
20
01
; 
 
EU
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
o
f th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
a
n
 
Co
m
m
u
n
iti
es
' 
Fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l I
n
te
re
st
s 
a
n
d 
th
e 
Pr
o
to
co
ls 
th
er
et
o
,
 
o
n
 
24
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
20
07
;  
EU
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
th
e 
fig
ht
 
a
ga
in
st
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
o
ffic
ia
ls 
o
f th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
a
n
 
Co
m
m
u
n
iti
es
 
o
r 
o
ffic
ia
ls 
o
f th
e 
EU
 
M
em
be
r 
St
a
te
s,
 
o
n
 
14
 
Fe
br
u
ar
y 
20
07
; 
th
e 
Cr
im
in
a
l L
a
w
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(E
TS
17
3) 
o
n
 
7 
n
o
v
.
20
01
; 
th
e 
Ad
di
tio
n
a
l P
ro
to
co
l t
o
 
th
e 
Cr
im
in
a
l L
a
w
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(E
TS
19
1) 
o
n
 
4 
Fe
br
u
ar
y 
20
04
.
 
 39
 
Cr
o
at
ia
 
 
Th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
Pe
n
a
l C
o
de
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
04
 
ar
e 
br
in
gi
n
g 
th
e 
su
bs
ta
n
tiv
e 
cr
im
in
al
 
la
w
 
in
 
lin
e 
w
ith
 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
st
an
da
rd
s;
 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l C
o
de
 
(en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
1 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
19
98
 
an
d 
le
ga
l a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
o
f 2
00
0,
 
20
04
,
 
 
20
06
); 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l P
ro
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
 
(19
98
); 
 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
Ac
t o
n
 
Pr
ev
e
n
tio
n
 
o
f C
o
n
flic
t o
f In
te
re
st
 
in
 
th
e 
Ex
er
ci
se
 
o
f P
u
bl
ic
 
O
ffi
ce
 
an
d 
to
 
th
e 
Ac
t o
n
 
Fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g 
Pr
es
id
en
tia
l E
le
ct
o
ra
l C
a
m
pa
ig
n
s,
 
in
 
bo
th
 
ca
se
s 
ai
m
ed
 
at
 
im
pr
o
v
in
g 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
,
 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
in
 
Ju
ly
 
an
d 
au
gu
st
 
20
05
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y;
 
 
A
 
W
itn
es
s 
Pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
Ac
t w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
03
;  
A
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Co
n
flic
t o
f In
te
re
st
 
in
 
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
 
o
f P
u
bl
ic
 
D
u
tie
s 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
03
;  
A
 
n
ew
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
Ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
03
;  
Pu
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t A
ct
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
03
; 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
A
ct
 
o
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
o
f M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
03
 
(am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
08
); 
Ci
vi
l S
er
va
n
t A
ct
 
(20
05
); 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Po
lit
ic
a
l P
a
rt
ie
s 
o
n
ly
 
pa
rt
ia
lly
 
re
gu
la
te
s 
th
e 
fu
n
di
n
g 
o
f p
o
lit
ic
al
 
pa
rt
ie
s.
 
 Cr
o
at
ia
 
 
ra
tif
ie
d 
th
e 
Cr
im
in
a
l L
a
w
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(E
TS
17
3) 
o
n
 
8 
N
o
v
.
20
00
 
an
d 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
1 
Ju
ly
 
20
02
.
 
 
Th
e 
Ad
di
tio
n
a
l P
ro
to
co
l t
o
 
th
e 
Cr
im
in
a
l L
a
w
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(E
TS
19
1) 
w
as
 
ra
tif
ie
d 
by
 
Cr
o
at
ia
 
o
n
 
10
 
m
ay
 
20
05
 
an
d 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
1 
se
pt
.
20
05
.
 
M
o
ld
o
v
a 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l C
o
de
 
(en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
o
n
 
20
03
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
su
bje
ct
 
o
f s
u
cc
es
siv
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
); 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l P
ro
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
 
(en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
20
03
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
su
bje
ct
 
o
f s
u
cc
es
siv
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
); 
 
Ac
t o
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tin
g 
a
n
d 
Co
m
ba
tin
g 
M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
a
n
d 
th
e 
Fu
n
di
n
g 
o
f T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
01
 
(am
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
07
); 
 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Ci
vi
l S
er
vi
ce
 
(19
95
 
w
ith
 
am
en
de
d),
 
se
e 
ar
tic
le
 
4 
o
n
 
th
e 
fu
n
da
m
en
ta
l p
rin
ci
pl
es
 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s;
 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Po
lit
ic
a
l P
a
rt
ie
s 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
19
91
(am
en
dm
en
ts
 
19
93
,
 
19
98
); 
La
w
 
o
f P
u
bl
ic
 
Pr
o
cu
re
m
en
t w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
19
97
; 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
fre
e 
a
cc
es
s 
to
 
in
for
m
a
tio
n
 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
in
te
re
st
 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
20
00
; 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tiv
e 
Pr
o
ce
ed
in
gs
 
Ac
t, 
La
bo
u
r 
Co
de
 
ar
tic
le
 
35
5 
an
d 
Pe
tit
io
n
s 
Ac
t p
ro
v
id
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ai
n
ts
 
ab
o
u
t t
he
 
de
ci
sio
n
s 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s;
 
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
16
 
o
f t
he
 
Ac
t o
n
 
Ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 
st
ip
u
la
te
s 
th
at
 
ev
er
yo
n
e 
ha
s 
th
e 
rig
ht
 
to
 
re
qu
es
t f
ro
m
 
pu
bl
ic
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s 
an
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
at
 
th
ei
r 
di
sp
o
sa
l; 
 
Co
de
 
o
f A
dm
in
is
tr
a
tiv
e 
O
ffe
n
ce
s;
 
 
Ac
t o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
a
n
d 
Ne
po
tis
m
.
 
 M
o
ld
o
v
a 
ra
tif
ie
d 
th
e 
Cr
im
in
a
l L
a
w
 
Co
n
ve
n
tio
n
 
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
(E
TS
17
3) 
o
n
 
14
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
20
04
.
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
 
La
w
 
n
o
.
 
24
4/
20
05
-
 
ab
o
lis
he
s 
th
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
o
f r
ed
ist
rib
u
tio
n
 
o
r 
ex
ce
pt
io
n
 
o
f p
ay
m
en
t o
f d
eb
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
st
at
e 
bu
dg
et
;  
 
La
w
 
n
o
.
24
1/
20
05
-
 
cr
im
in
al
 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s 
fo
r 
ta
x
 
do
dg
in
g;
 
 
La
w
 
n
o
.
24
7/
20
05
-
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
pr
o
se
cu
to
rs
’
 
in
de
pe
n
de
n
ce
,
 
di
m
in
ish
in
g 
th
e 
at
tr
ib
u
tio
n
s 
o
f t
he
 
he
ad
s 
o
f c
o
u
rt
s 
an
d 
pr
o
se
cu
to
rs
 
o
ffi
ce
s 
et
c.
.
;  
La
w
 
n
o
.
90
/2
00
5-
 
re
pe
al
ed
 
th
e 
im
m
u
n
ity
 
an
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 
o
f r
es
po
n
sib
ili
ty
 
to
 
fo
rm
er
 
m
in
ist
er
s 
fo
r 
fa
ct
s 
an
d 
ac
ts
 
ca
rr
ie
d 
o
u
t w
hi
le
 
in
 
o
ffi
ce
;  
La
w
 
n
o
.
38
3/
20
05
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
fu
n
ct
io
n
s 
o
f t
he
 
G
en
er
al
 
A
n
ti-
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
O
ffi
ce
;  
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t E
m
er
ge
n
cy
 
D
ec
re
e 
n
o
.
 
12
4/
20
05
-
 
th
is 
de
cr
ee
 
am
en
ds
 
La
w
 
n
o
.
 
76
/2
00
0 
o
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tin
g,
 
Id
en
tif
yi
n
g 
an
d 
Sa
n
ct
io
n
in
g 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
-
R
el
at
ed
 
O
ffe
n
ce
s;
 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tin
g,
 
D
is
co
ve
rin
g 
a
n
d 
Sa
n
ct
io
n
in
g 
o
f C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Ac
ts
;  
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
de
ci
si
o
n
a
l t
ra
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
 
in
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Ad
m
in
is
tr
a
tio
n
 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
20
03
); 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
th
e 
St
a
tu
te
 
o
f C
iv
il 
Se
rv
a
n
ts
 
(D
ec
em
be
r 
19
99
); 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
fre
e 
a
cc
es
s 
to
 
in
for
m
a
tio
n
 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
in
te
re
st
 
(O
ct
o
be
r 
20
01
); 
 
Th
e 
la
w
 
o
n
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
In
te
rn
a
l A
u
di
t ;
 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
Pu
n
ish
m
en
t o
f M
o
n
ey
 
La
u
n
de
ri
n
g 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
o
n
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
19
99
 
( a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
20
02
,
 
20
05
, 
20
06
); 
 
Th
e 
La
w
 
o
n
 
W
itn
es
s 
Pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
(N
o
v
em
be
r 
20
03
); 
Th
e 
Ro
m
a
n
ia
n
 
Cr
im
in
a
l C
o
de
 
(19
69
); 
 
Cr
im
in
a
l P
ro
ce
du
re
 
Co
de
 
(19
69
); 
 
La
w
 
n
o
.
78
/2
00
0 
o
n
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g,
 
di
sc
o
ve
ri
n
g 
a
n
d 
sa
n
ct
io
n
in
g 
o
f c
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
a
ct
s 
(in
to
 
fo
rc
e 
1d
ec
.
20
06
); 
La
w
 
o
n
 
pa
rt
ie
s 
fin
a
n
ci
n
g 
a
n
d 
el
ec
to
ra
l c
a
m
pa
ig
n
s 
w
as
 
ad
o
pt
ed
 
in
 
19
96
 
(am
en
dm
en
ts
20
03
). 
Na
tio
n
a
l P
ro
gr
a
m
 
o
n
 
th
e 
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